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Abstract
This paper studies whether Chinese provinces set strategically their environmental
stringency when faced with interprovincial competition for mobile capital. Using Chinese
provincial data and spatial panel econometric models, we find that Chinese provinces do
engage in this kind of strategic interaction, particularly among those with similar industrial
structure. Furthermore, we haven’t found evidence of asymmetric responsiveness suggested
by the race to the bottom theory. Finally, the one-sided fiscal decentralization is likely to
strengthen the strategic behavior. These empirical results call for a skeptical attitude
towards China’s decentralization of environment policy implementation as well as its fiscal
arrangements.
JEL Classification: R5, H7, Q5, C2
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1. Introduction
Interjurisdictional relationship in environmental policymaking is an important subject in
environmental federalism literature. Primarily focusing on the vertical division of
responsibilities among different levels of government (Oates and Portney, 2003),
environmental federalism researchers pay great attention to decentralization. For more than
two decades, decentralization has been promoted by major international institutions in the
worldwide and has become a trend in many developing countries (World Bank, 2000).
However, despite its numerous advantages (Hayek, 1945; Oates, 1999; Tiebout, 1956), no
consensus has been achieved on the efficiency of decentralization in providing environmental
services (Fredriksson et al., 2006). One common opponent opinion is that decentralized
authority can lead to strategic interaction among jurisdictions and result in inefficient
environmental policy. According to the capital-competition theory, in order to attract mobile
capital, jurisdictions will choose strategically their environmental regulatory enforcement vis-
à-vis their competitors. In the U.S. context, critics of decentralization often argue that states
are primarily concerned with economic development and will relax their environmental
regulation to gain an advantage over other states (Konisky, 2007).
Critical to the efficiency of decentralization, strategic interaction among governments is a
major focus of theoretical and empirical work in public economics. Brueckner (2003)
classifies strategic interaction models into two branches, namely spillover models and
resource-flow models. Although these models were initially developed for fiscal or public
finance policymaking, they are also widely used in environmental federalism studies to
investigate strategic interaction in environmental policymaking among the U.S. states and
among European countries. According to Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), fears of a
destructive competition and excessive pollution were a significant factor leading to the
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formation of the EPA in 1968 and the regulatory harmonization policy across the European
Union.
China offers an interesting field to conduct strategic interaction researches. On one hand,
environmental policy implementation system is strongly decentralized in China. Testing for
strategic interaction in environmental regulatory enforcement will help us to understand the
efficiency of this system. In this country, while the Ministry of Environmental Protection is in
charge of the establishment of environmental laws, regulations, standards and policies,
environmental policy implementation is the responsibility of the Environmental Protection
Bureaus at regional and local level (OECD, 2006). In 2009, more than 90% of national public
expenditures on environment were realized at subnational level. Chinese provincial
governments have de facto power over environmental stringency enforcement. On the other
hand, Chinese provinces are very likely to engage in capital competition. It is well known that
Chinese local officials are appointed by the central government. Several studies show that
after the 1978 reform, Chinese central government has created a yardstick competition among
local officials in evaluating the latter on the basis of economic performance (Li and Zhou,
2005; Maskin et al., 2000; Qian and Xu, 1993). This economic performance based
competition can give local governments strong incentives to engage in capital completion at
the cost of environment.
However, to our knowledge, very few studies have investigated strategic interaction in
environmental regulation enforcement among Chinese jurisdictions. In this paper, we try to
contribute to this part of literature in studying whether Chinese provinces set strategically
their environmental stringency vis-à-vis their competitors for mobile capital. First we test for
the existence of strategic interaction. Then we examine whether the strategic interaction
follows the asymmetric pattern suggested by the race to the bottom theory. Finally, we study
whether this strategic interaction is conditional on fiscal decentralization. The rest of paper is
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organized as follows: in section 2, a brief literature review is made on theoretical and
empirical studies of environmental regulatory strategic interaction. Our estimation strategy is
presented in section 3. In section 4 we report our empirical results. And in the last section we
conclude.
2. Literature review
According to Revelli (2005), local governments can be thought of as interacting with one
another along three main channels: preferences, constraints and expectations, which
correspond respectively to the spillover, resource-flow and yardstick competition models
classified in Brueckner (2003). Although these models were originally created to explain
fiscal and public finance policymaking, they can be and have been already borrowed by a lot
of environmental strategic interaction researches. Capital-competition models can be
classified into the constraints interaction (or resource-flow) models. This branch of models is
originally presented by tax competition theory (Oates, 1972). Tax competition theory assumes
that jurisdictions compete with each other using tax rates for a fixed amount of mobile
resource, in order to maximize local welfare (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Buettner, 2001;
Wilson, 1986). In the field of environmental regulatory enforcement, competition can take
place among jurisdictions if they compete with each other with environmental stringency for a
fixed amount of mobile capital. A great number of theoretical studies address this subject
(Dijkstra, 2003; Glazer, 1999; Kunce, 2004; Kunce and Shogren, 2002, 2005, 2007; Levinson,
1997; Markusen et al., 1995; Oates and Schwab, 1988; Roelfsema, 2007; Wellisch, 1995).
These studies establish the framework to analyze welfare implication of interjurisdictional
environmental regulatory competition. Particularly, many of them are interested in the “race
to the bottom” hypothesis, under which destructive competition leads to excessively lax
environmental stringency.
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Numerous studies have found empirical evidences of environmental regulatory strategic
interaction. For example, Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) measure the regulatory stringency
by the environmental abatement costs and find that U.S. states do incorporate asymmetrically
their neighboring states’ regulatory stringency into their own decision making, i.e., a state is
incited to apply higher abatement costs if its neighbors with relatively stringent regulations
increase theirs. Using two panels of data on states' regulatory stringency, Levinson (2003)
examines whether regulatory competition becomes more severe during the Reagan
administration, when state control of environmental policy is greater. He finds that “states
behave strategically, reacting to other states' environmental standard stringency when setting
their own,” but he doesn’t find convincing evidence that competition steepened during the
Reagan administration. Woods (2006) conducts an analysis of state surface-mining regulation
to determine if the enforcement gap between a state and its competitor affects the stringency
of the former. He finds evidence for a race to the bottom because states adjust their
enforcement in response to their competitors when the enforcement stringency of the former
exceeds that of the latter. Konisky (2007) compiles data on state enforcement of three U.S.
federal pollution control programs: the CAA, the CWA, and the RCRA.1 He constructs two
measures of annual state enforcement effort: the annual number of sampling inspections and
the unweighted sum of informal and formal punitive actions. Using spatial panels, he finds
robust evidence of strategic regulatory behavior across the U.S. states. However, his evidence
does not support the asymmetric pattern of strategic interaction predicted by the race to the
bottom theory.
3. Estimation strategy
This section presents the strategy we will use in the empirical analysis and different issues to
be considered in estimation.
3.1. Spatial econometric issues
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The standard way to test empirically for strategic interaction is using a spatial-lag model
(Brueckner, 2003). This model is typically considered as the formal specification for the
equilibrium outcome of a spatial or social interaction process, in which the value of the
dependent variable for one agent is jointly determined with that of the neighboring agents
(Elhorst, 2010). In a spatial-lag model, the pattern of interaction among jurisdictions is
modeled by specifying a particular weighting matrix. The standard spatial-lag panel model
can be written as follows:
it jt i t it
j i
Y δ Y μ d ε
≠
= + + + +∑ ijtW kitβX
<1,δ 1,..., ,i N= 1,..., ,k K= 1,...,t T= (1)
where index i is for the cross-sectional dimension (provinces in our sample), t is for the time
dimension,
it
Y is the dependent variable, ijtW is an N
2 ordered spatial weight matrix
describing the importance of assigned to jurisdiction j by jurisdiction i at time t,
jt
j i
Y
≠
∑ ijtW is
the spatially lagged dependant variable,
kit
X
is an (N,K) vector of independent variables, β is
a (K,1) vector of fixed but unknown parameters, δ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient,
i
μ
denotes a spatial specific effect which controls for all space-specific time-invariant variables
whose omission could bias the estimates in a typical cross-sectional study, d
t
is a time specific
effect which controls for all unobservable space-invariant omitted variables, and
it
ε
is an
independently and identically distributed error term with zero mean and variance 2
σ
.
In (1),
jt
j i
Y
≠
∑ ijtW is endogenous because of simultaneous causation with regard to
it
Y
. In
order to address this problem, two methods have been developed. The first one is a maximum
likelihood (ML) estimator proposed by Anselin (1988), and the second one is a two-stage
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least squared instrumental variables (2SLS-IV) method proposed by Kelejian and Prucha
(1998). According to Anselin (1988), spatial autocorrelation across data can emerge in two
ways: on one hand, spatial-lag autocorrelation emerges when
it
Y
and
jt
j i
Y
≠
∑ ijtW are
simultaneous determined by each other; on the other hand, spatial-error autocorrelation
emerges if error terms are spatially autocorrelated with each other. Before using the ML
estimator, a choice between spatial-lag and spatial-error models must be made, otherwise
estimation of (1) can provide false evidence of strategic interaction (Brueckner, 2003). For
this purpose, Anselin et al. (1996) propose the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test and its robust
version. However, the LM test as well as the ML estimator requires a normal distribution of
error terms, otherwise test statistics would be biased (Elhorst, 2010).
Unfortunately, Jacque-Bera statistics reported in Table 1 suggest that normal distribution
condition can’t be satisfied in this paper. That’s why we turn to the alternative 2SLS-IV
method. The 2SLS-IV approach has been used in numerous strategic government interaction
studies (Figlio et al., 1999; Fredriksson and Millimet, 2002b; Levinson, 2003). This IV
method has the virtue of not depending on normal distribution hypothesis. Moreover, Kelejian
and Prucha (1998) show that their method generates a consistent estimate even in the presence
of spatial-error dependence. The standard application of the 2SLS-IV approach is to
instrument for Y
jt
with a subset of the weighted characteristics of competitors-
j i≠
∑ ijtW kjtX .
The first stage of the 2SLS takes the form of (2):
,
jt it
j i j i
Y a η
≠ ≠
= + +∑ ∑ijt ijtW W kjtb X 1,..., ,i N= 1,..., ,k K= 1,...,t T= (2)
where
j i≠
∑ ijtW kjtX is a subset of weighted average of competitors’ characteristics, which
satisfies the instrument exclusion restrictions.
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3.2. Identification issues
Two major issues arise when one tries to identify potential strategic interaction among
jurisdictions. The first one is to identify neighbors against non-neighbors. The second one is
to assign appropriate relative importance to each designated neighbor. Both of these issues
have to be addressed in constructing weighting matrices which reflect interaction patters
among jurisdictions.
Concerning neighbors against non-neighbors identification, it is reasonable to assume that
the decision making of a Chinese province may be affected by only a certain number of other
provinces (defined as its neighbors), and not by all other provinces. In the literature, different
neighbor definitions have been adopted. The simplest and commonly used one is a
geographical contiguous definition. This definition assumes that jurisdictions interact with
each other if they share common borders. The corresponding weighting matrix for contiguous
neighbors is a contiguity matrix. In a contiguity matrix, “one” is given to two cities sharing
common border and “zero” in the opposite case. A second way to define neighbors is based
on geographical distance: jurisdictions are considered as neighbors if the geographical
distance between them is inferior to a certain critical value. A third way to identify neighbors
is based on similarity criteria. This definition assumes that jurisdictions may interact with
each other not because they share the same border but because they share a set of similarities,
e.g., the same region, similar industrial structure, similar income per capita, similar racial
composition, etc. In the U.S. context, two regional classifications are frequently used, namely
the BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis) classification and the classification proposed by
Crone (1998/1999).
It is also important to assign relative importance to different neighbors. Implicit in the
choice of weights is the assumption that states may be more responsive to environmental
policy in neighboring states responsible for greater generation of transboundary pollution or
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greater competition for capital. Different weighting schemes have been adopted in the
literature. For example, Fredriksson et al. (2004) and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) each
use three different schemes, namely equal weights, population weights, and income weights.
Konisky (2007) uses population weights and argued that results are not sensitive to weighting
choice. In a distance matrix, neighbors are weighted by the inverse of geographical distance
(Madariaga and Poncet, 2007). In an income similarity matrix, neighbors are weighted by the
inverse of absolute value of income per capita difference (Case et al., 1993).
Identification of interaction pattern is an important issue. As argued in Revelli (2005),
although spatial econometric methods allow testing for existence of strategic interaction, they
do not allow discriminating among different theoretical explanations for the observed spatial
autocorrelation. The simple reason is that although strategic interaction models can be based
on different assumptions, they conduct to the same reaction function for empirical analysis
(Brueckner, 2003). In this paper, we try to test for capital-competition driven strategic
interaction among Chinese provinces. For this purpose, different weighting matrices are
adopted. First of all, classical contiguity matrices with equal, population and income weights
are used to test for the overall effect. It is notable that strategic interaction associated to these
geographically based patterns may be a mix of different effects (e.g., pollution spillovers,
capital competition.) As a result, in order to test more specifically for capital competition, an
industrial structure similarity matrix is constructed with yearly sectorial data of each province.
This matrix weights a province’s neighbor by an index of industrial structure similarity
between them.2 The implicit assumption is that competition for capital is more likely to take
place between provinces with similar industrial structures. Because no geographical
constraints are imposed to industrial structure similarity, there is no reason to expect that this
matrix captures pollution spillovers.
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3.3. Asymmetric effects model
Following Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) and Konisky (2007), we consider an alternative
model where provinces’ responsiveness is asymmetric:
0 1(1 )it it jt it jt i t it
j i j i
Y δ I Y δ I Y μ d ε
≠ ≠
= + − + + + +∑ ∑ijt ijtW W kitβX
1,..., ,i N= 1,..., ,k K= 1,...,t T= (3)
where I
it
= 1, if ;
it jt
j i
Y Y
≠
>∑ ijtW
I
it
= 0, otherwise.
This specific asymmetric pattern is suggested by the race to the bottom theory, according to
which a province responds to its competitors only if its own regulatory situation is at a
disadvantage vis-à-vis its competitors.3 In (3), I
it
= 1 if province i’s own environmental
stringency is above that of its competitors, i.e., i is at a disadvantage for attracting mobile
capital relative to its competitors. On the contrary, I
it
= 0 if province i’s own environmental
stringency is below that of its competitors, i.e., i is at an advantage for attracting mobile
capital relative to its competitors. The race to the bottom theory suggests that 0 0δ > , and
that 1δ should not be statistically different from zero.
3.4. Nonlinear effects model
It is possible that strategic interaction among provinces is not linear and is conditional on
certain provincial characteristics, e.g., fiscal arrangements. China has a one-sided fiscal
decentralization: while public expenditures are largely decentralized, fiscal revenues are
recentralized after 1994. In this context, subnational governments suffer from significant
fiscal imbalances and have excessively heavy expenditure responsibilities which are
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mismatched with their revenue assignments (World Bank, 2002). These governments depend
largely on intergovernmental transfers, which are not always transparent or adequate. It is
argued that in many poor localities, fiscal gap has led to the under-provision of basic public
services (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2007). Environment can also be victim of this situation:
given the severe budgetary pressures, local governments may use lax environmental
stringency as a tool for attracting mobile capital and creating taxable resources. If this is the
case, fiscal imbalance will matter for capital-competition driven strategic interaction. It is
reasonable to assume that provinces with greater fiscal imbalance would be likely to react
more strategically when enforcing their environmental stringency. In order to control for this
nonlinear effect, we introduce an interaction
jt it
Y IMB∗ijtW , where IMBit is an indicator of
fiscal imbalance of province i in year t. The nonlinear effects model to estimate is as follows:
it jt it jt it i t it
j i j i
Y δ Y φ IMB Y π IMB μ d ε
≠ ≠
= + ∗ + + + + +∑ ∑ijt ijtW Wi i kitβX
1,..., ,i N= 1,..., ,k K= 1,...,t T= (4)
4. Empirical analysis - strategic interaction among Chinese provinces
4.1. Data and variables
We use a panel dataset of 30 Chinese provinces (Tibet, Hongkong and Macao excluded) over
the period 2004-2009. The main sources of data are China Statistical Yearbook (2005-2010),
China Environment Yearbook (2005-2010) and China Industrial Economic Statistical
Yearbook (2005-2010). 2004 is chosen as the beginning year of our study because it is the
year when China Industrial Economic Statistical Yearbook starts to publish consistent data of
added values by industrial sector for each province. Before that year, data of several sectors,
e.g., textile garments, shoes and caps products, and special equipment manufacturing industry,
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were not reported. Since consistent sectorial data are indispensible to construct our industrial
similarity weighting matrix, we decide to focus on the period post-2004.
The dependent variable (Y) is provincial pollution levy per industrial added value. We use
this indicator as a proxy of environmental stringency. The nationwide implementation of
pollution levy system in China was started in 1982 (Wang and Wheeler, 2005). First designed
for above-standard waste water discharges, this system was expanded to both below-standard
and above-standard waste water discharges and air pollution in the 1990s (Wu, 2010).
Provincial levy per industrial added value can be proxy of the environmental stringency for
several reasons: first, In China, concentration standards for levy collection are set jointly at
the national and provincial levels thus vary across provinces (Dean et al., 2009). Secondly,
pollution levy is an economic instrument implemented at local level. Several studies show
that levy affects significantly polluters’ behaviors (Dasgupta et al., 2001; Wang and Wheeler,
2003).
Finally, different from other studies which use levy per volume of pollution (e.g., Dean et
al. (2009)), we use levy per industrial added value because only aggregated levy data (without
details by pollutant) have been reported during the period 2004-2009. As a result, levy per
industrial added value is a proxy of the overall environmental stringency.
In order to test for nonlinear effects, provincial fiscal imbalance (IMB) is introduced in
equation (4). IMB is a vertical imbalance indicator defined by (5):
,it
it
it
Transfers
IMB
Expenditures
= 1,..., ,t T= 1,...,i I= (5)
where i denotes the province, t denotes the year, Transfers
it
denotes the total fiscal transfers
that province i receives from the central government in year t, and Expenditures
it
denotes the
consolidated budgetary expenditures spent by province i in year t. The construction of IMB is
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inspired by IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), where vertical imbalance of a
country is measured by transfers to sub-national governments as a share of sub-national
government expenditures. In this paper, IMB measures the degree to which province i relies
on transfers from central government to support its expenditures.4
Other independent variables are introduced to control for provincial characteristics. First
of all, one may argue that levy per industrial added value of a province is not only determined
by its environmental stringency but also by the pollution intensity of its industrial production.
It is true that a province with weak environmental standards may collect high levy per
industrial added value if more pollution is associated to its unit of industrial production. In
order to control for this endogeneity, we introduce intensities of two major industrial
pollutants – SO2 and COD (chemical oxygen demand) per industrial added value
(SO2intensity and CODintensity). Then, in following the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC)
hypothesis, we include gross regional product (GRP) per capita (a proxy of income per capita),
its squared term (GRP2) and its cubed term (GRP3). Income per capita reflects economic
development level of a province. It is considered to affect its environmental performance of
the latter because an economically more developed province may care more about
environment and have more resources for environmental protection. After that, population
density (Density) is also included. Population density can affect environmental performance
through economic scale effects. Governments may also make more efforts to abate pollution
where it’s more densely populated. In addition, Wang et al. (2003) show that state-owned
enterprises have more bargaining power with local environmental authorities when
negotiating the enforcement of pollution levy. As a result, we suppose that the importance of
state-owned sector in a province’s industry may have an effect on its environmental
stringency. To capture this effect, we introduce the proportion of industrial added value
realized by state-owned enterprises (State). Moreover, two openness variables – trade opening
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(Trade) and FDI (FDI) are also included. Trade opening may affect a province’s industrial
structure and further more affect its environmental stringency though the “composition”
effect5 (Cole and Elliott, 2003). We introduce FDI because environmental levy enforcement is
shown to have effect on FDI localization among provinces (Dean et al., 2009; He, 2006). It is
possible that provinces with different levels of FDI have different level of incentives use
pollution levy for attracting foreign capital. Furthermore, public pressure can also affect the
enforcement of environmental levy (Wang and Di, 2002; Wang and Wheeler, 2003). Two
variables are introduced to control for this effect: citizen complaint letters (Letters) regarding
environmental issues and percentage of population with high-education (Edu). Finally,
provincial specific effects and year dummies are introduced to control for non-observed
provincial or yearly specific effects. Variable definition and descriptive statistics are reported
in Appendix 2 and 3.
4.2. Estimation results
Estimation results are reported first for contiguity matrices with different weighting schedules
and then for industrial structure similarity matrix with linear, asymmetric and nonlinear
effects.
4.2.1. Results with contiguity matrices
Table 1 presents estimation results of equation (1) with contiguity matrices. Equal weights,
population weights, and income weights are used respectively. Jacque-Bera test statistics
show strongly abnormal residuals, which lead us to prefer IV estimator to ML estimator.
Hausman test statistics allow rejecting its null hypothesis in none of the specifications. So
efficient models with random effects are preferred and adopted. Column 1 presents results
with equally weighting contiguity matrix. Column 2 presents results with population
weighting contiguity matrix, and column 3 presents results with income weighting contiguity
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matrix. A subset of ijtW kjtX is used as instruments in all regressions.
6 Kleibergen-Paap rk LM
statistics indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of underidentified instruments for all
2SLS regressions; the null hypothesis of exogenous
ijt
j i
Y
≠
∑ ijtW is strongly rejected for equal
and income weights and cannot be rejected at 5% level for population weights; Hansen
statistics show that we can’t reject the null hypothesis that the instruments satisfy the
orthogonality conditions at the confidence level of 5%.
Results show that for equal and income weights, everything else being equal,
geographical contiguous provinces do interact strategically with each other and in the same
direction in setting their environmental stringency enforcement. However, the strategic
interaction found in these two cases is weak in level (with elasticities inferior to 0.1) and in
significance. (The null hypothesis of zero strategic interaction cannot rejected at the
confidence level of 5%.) Regarding population weights, the absence of strategic interaction
cannot be rejected at 10% level. These results suggest that strategic interaction among
contiguous provinces is weak and positive, if there is any. Nevertheless, we should be
skeptical facing these results because as stated previously, contiguity is a very simplified
interaction pattern: on one hand, provinces may interact with each other even if they don’t
share common borders; on the other hand, given different theoretical explanation behind
strategic interaction, the weak evidence may simply be due to a mix of different driving
effects.
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Table 1: Results of (1) with different weighting contiguity matrices
Y=Levy Equally weighting
contiguity matrix
Population weighting
contiguity matrix
Income weighting contiguity
matrix
ijt
j i
Y
≠
∑ ijtW 0.069* (0.056) 0.079 (0.131)) 0.090* (0.057))
GRP3 -0.231*** (0.001) -0.233*** (0.001) -0.223*** (0.001)
GRP2 5.357*** (0.001) 5.406*** (0.001) 5.165*** (0.001)
GRP -40.845*** (0.001) -41.160*** (0.001) -39.405*** (0.001)
SO2intensity 0.562*** (0.000) 0.565*** (0.000) 0.583*** (0.000)
CODintensity 0.070 (0.543) 0.071 (0.564) 0.064 (0.589)
Density 0.144** (0.045) 0.161** (0.021) 0.162** (0.015)
State -0.179 (0.606) 0.415 (0.562) 0.527 (0.453)
Trade -0.327 (0.214 ) -0.323 (0.241) -0.307 (0.244)
FDI -3.323 (0.110) -3.485 (0.108) -3.271 (0.117)
Letters -0.085*** (0.001) -0.084*** (0.002) -0.082*** (0.002)
Edu -0.367 (0.838) -0.155 (0.932) -0.184 (0.916)
Dum2005 0.081 (0.210) 0.076 (0.270) 0.075 (0.272)
Dum2006 0.076 (0.293) 0.069 (0.356) 0.072 (0.328)
Dum2007 -0.045 (0.671) -0.042 (0.710) -0.030 (0.781)
Dum2008 0.045 (0.777) 0.056 (0.746) 0.072 (0.664)
Dum2009 -0.037 (0.853) -0.013 (0.954) 0.010 (0.964)
Constant 97.672*** (0.003) 98.082*** (0.002) 93.876*** (0.003)
Number of obs 180 180 180
Number of groups 6 6 6
Centered R2 0.520 0.511 0.521
Uncentered R2 0.986 0.985 0.987
Jacque-Bera test Prob>chi2 (0.000)
Hausman test Prob>chi2 (0.645) (0.612) (0.940)
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM
statistic Prob>chi2
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Anderson-Rubin Wald test
Prob>chi2
(0.021) (0.154) (0.005)
Hansen J statistic Prob>chi2 (0.146) (0.458) (0.225)
Note: Heteroscedastic-consistent p-value in parentheses, with ***, ** and * denoting significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level,
respectively
4.2.1 Strategic interaction with industrial structure similarity matrix
Estimation results with industrial structure similarity matrix are presented in Table 2. The first
column reports results for linear strategic interaction as specified in (1); the second column
reports results for asymmetric strategic interaction as specified in (3); and the third column
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reports results for nonlinear strategic interaction as specified in (4). In all 2SLS regressions,
models with random effects are preferred. Test statistics show that our specifications are fitted:
the null hypothesis of underidentified instruments and the null hypothesis of the absence of
endogeneity are rejected at 5%; the null hypothesis of overidentified instruments cannot be
rejected at 5%.
Table 2: Strategic interaction with industrial structure similarity matrix
Results of (1) Results of (3) Results of (4)
it ijt
j i
IMB Y
≠
∗∑ ijtW 2.106** (0.032)
it ijt
j i
I Y
≠
∑ ijtW 1.461* (0.071)
(1 )
it ijt
j i
I Y
≠
− ∑ ijtW 1.519* (0.061)
ijt
j i
Y
≠
∑ ijtW 1.947** (0.050) 1.869** (0.049)
GRP3 -0.240*** (0.002) -0.221*** (0.003) -0.310*** (0.000)
GRP2 5.664*** (0.001) 5.168*** (0.003) 7.151*** (0.000)
GRP -44.020*** (0.001) -39.891*** (0.002) -54.721*** (0.000)
SO2intensity 0.438*** (0.001) 0.398*** (0.000) 0.449*** (0.000)
CODintensity 0.141 (0.230) 0.100 (0.273) 0.151 (0.178)
Density 0.144* (0.057) 0.153*** (0.007) 0.128* (0.094)
State -0.509 (0.226) -0.191 (0.580) -0.543 (0.214)
Trade -0.211 (0.486) -0.145 (0.584) -0.099 (0.739)
FDI -2.668 (0.189) -2.472 (0.146) -2.290 (0.265)
Letters -0.094*** (0.000) -0.073*** (0.002) -0.097*** (0.000)
Edu -0.028 (0.988) -0.149 (0.922) 1.136 (0.567)
IMB 13.143** (0.042)
Dum2005 -0.041 (0.688) -0.042 (0.638) -0.123 (0.287)
Dum2006 0.049 (0.547) 0.012 (0.875) 0.031 (0.706)
Dum2007 0.044 (0.712) -0.037 (0.710) 0.131 (0.265)
Dum2008 0.554* (0.067) 0.323 (0.202) 0.931*** (0.005)
Dum2009 0.676 (0.102) 0.390 (0.270) 1.231*** (0.008)
Constant 120.567*** (0.000) 105.775*** (0.001) 146.316*** (0.000)
Number of obs 180 180 180
Number of groups 6 6 6
Centered R2 0.472 0.636 0.463
Uncentered R2 0.985 0.993 0.988
Hausman test Prob>chi2 (0.338) (0.076) (0.783)
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic Prob>chi2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Anderson-Rubin Wald test Prob>chi2 (0.013) (0.000) (0.037)
Hansen J statistic Prob>chi2 (0.110) (0.056) (0.216)
Note: Heteroscedastic-consistent p-value in parentheses, with ***, ** and * denoting respectively significance at 1, 5 and 10
percent level
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Obviously, strategic interaction among provinces with similar industrial structure is
much stronger and more significant than what was found among contiguous neighbors. When
linear effect is considered, estimation results of equation (1) show that everything else being
equal, a province would decrease (increase) its own environmental levy per industrial added
value by 1.947% if its weighted competitors decrease (increase) theirs by 1%. The null
hypothesis of zero strategic interaction can be rejected at the confidence level of 5%. These
results suggest that environmental regulation stringencies of industrial competitors are
effectively strategically determined.
When equation (3) is estimated, results reported in the second column don’t show
evidence of asymmetric responsiveness. According to the race to the bottom theory, only the
coefficient of
it jt
j i
I Y
≠
∑ ijtW should be positive and significant. However, we find that the
coefficients of
it jt
j i
I Y
≠
∑ ijtW and (1 )it jt
j i
I Y
≠
− ∑ ijtW are both positive and weakly significant.
This finding suggests that, no matter whether a province’s environmental stringency is stricter
or not than its competitors, strategic interaction is not asymmetrically differential as predicted
by the race to the bottom theory.7
Finally, estimation results of the nonlinear effects model (4) are reported in the last
column. Consistent with the prediction in section 3, the interaction
jt it
Y IMB∗ijtW has a positive
and significant coefficient of 2.106, which suggests that strategic interaction among provinces
is conditional on provincial fiscal imbalance. The more a province is fiscally dependent on
central government’s transfers for expenditure, the more strategically it will set its
environmental stringency vis-à-vis its competitors. These results are helpful to understand the
potential inefficiency of China’s actual fiscal decentralization system for public good
provision, especially in the environmental protection domain. Marginal effects of
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competitors’ environmental stringency conditional on fiscal imbalance are presented in
Appendix 4. Over the period 2004-2009, the province which has the strongest strategic
interaction would be Qinghai, with a mean marginal effect of 3.688; the province which has
the weakest strategic interaction would be Beijing, with a mean marginal effect of 2.233. In
other words, everything else being equal, a decrease (an increase) of 1% in environmental
stringency of their competitors would induce Qianghai and Beijing to decrease (increase) their
own environmental stringency by 3.688% and 2.233%, respectively. It is notable that the
significant nonlinear effects suggest that our strategic interaction is indeed driven by capital
competition rather than pollution spillovers. The reason is that severe fiscal pressure can
create strong incentives to attract mobile resources but has little to do with transboundary
pollution problems.
Concerning control variables, GRP per capita, its squared and cubed terms have
significant coefficients in all regressions. Population density has always a positive and
significant coefficient, suggesting that everything else being equal, environmental stringency
is stricter where it is more populated. In addition, complaint letter number has always a
negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that public pressure weakens environmental
stringency. This seems against intuition but is not surprising: public pressure of a province
and its environmental stringency may be simultaneously affected. It is normal that stricter
environmental stringency leads to fewer complaints. Given that complaint letter number is
only a control variable, we don’t address its endogeneity in this paper.
5. Conclusion:
Critics of decentralization often argue that capital competition and strategic interaction among
jurisdictions in environmental regulatory enforcement may lead to inefficiently weak
stringency and excessive pollution. Although this subject has been extensively studied in the
U.S. context, very little attention has been given to the case of China. This paper contributes
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to the environmental federalism literature in addressing the question of whether Chinese
provinces engage in strategic environmental policymaking.
More specifically, we study whether Chinese provinces set strategically their
environmental stringency vis-à-vis their competitors for mobile economic investment. It
seems to us that this capital-competition driven strategic interaction is high likely to exist
because, on one hand, Chinese central government has created a economic-performance based
yardstick competition among local officials thus a strong local political incentive to attract
investment; on the other hand, environmental policy implementation is largely decentralized,
which endows Chinese local governments de facto authority of environmental stringency
enforcement and the possibility to use it as investment-attracting instrument. Using Chinese
provincial data and spatial panel econometric methods, we find that Chinese provinces do
engage in strategic interaction when they set their pollution levy. Moreover, this strategic
interaction is particularly strong among provinces with similar industrial structure (i.e.,
potential competitors for attracting mobile capital). Furthermore, we haven’t found evidence
of asymmetric responsiveness suggested by the race to the bottom theory. Provinces respond
strategically no matter whether they are at an advantage or a disadvantage. Finally, the one-
sided fiscal decentralization arrangements may strengthen strategic interaction.
Our empirical results in Chinese context lead us to take a skeptical attitude about the
decentralization of environment policy implementation in this country. The strategic
interaction among provinces driven by capital competition could be one of the reasons for
China’s severe environmental degradation. Meanwhile, it is notable that the positive
interaction also suggests a possibility to improve the whole environment beginning by some
pilot regions. After all, it would be of great importance to develop more appropriate
institutions for environmental protection and resource allocation in China, in paying more
attention to both vertical and horizontal interjurisdictional relations.
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Notes
1. Abbreviations of three federal pollution control programs: the Clean Air Act (CAA), the
Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
2. Different indices have been proposed in the literature to estimate structure similarity
between economies (Brixiova et al., 2010; Krugman, 1991; Landesmann and Szekely,
1995; UNIDO, 1979). In this paper, we utilize the index proposed by UNIDO (1979).
More details on the construction of this index can be found in Appendix 1.
3. The race to the bottom theory suggests also another asymmetric pattern: a jurisdiction
responds only if the weighted average of its competitors' environmental enforcement
efforts drop from the previous year (Konisky, 2007). We haven’t tested for this model
because quasi total observations in our sample have decreasing pollution levy over the
period 2004-2009.
4. Following the GFS indicator, IMB doesn’t distinguish conditional transfers versus general
purpose transfers, due to data unavailability.
5. The “composition” effect refers to the way that trade liberalization changes the mix of a
country’s production towards those products where it has a comparative advantage.
6. The contiguity matrix with equal weights is not time-variant.
7. In the U.S. context, Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) and Konisky (2007) haven’t found
asymmetric effects suggested by the race to bottom theory neither.
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Appendix 1: Industrial structure similarity index (UNIDO, 1979)
In order to construct our Industrial structure similarity matrix, we use the industrial structure
similarity index proposed by UNIDO (1979). This index can be calculated as follows:
1
2 2
1 1
,
n
ikt jkt
k
ijt
n n
ikt jkt
k k
X X
S
X X
=
= =
=
∑
∑ ∑
1,..., ,i N= ,j i≠ 1,...,t T=
where i and j denote provinces, t denotes the year, S
ijt
is the industrial structure similarity
index between province i and province j, k denotes the industry, X
ikt
and X
jkt
denote the
employment number (or added value) in (created by) industry k in provinces i and j,
respectively. S
ijt
has a value between zero and one and increases with the similarity level
between province i and province j. S
ijt
takes the value “one” when province i and province j
have exactly the same industrial structure. In this paper, default of sectorial added value data
in several years, we calculte S
ijt
with employment data of 27 industrial sectors published in
China Industrial Economic Statistical Yearbook (2005-2010). These 27 sectors are:
production and supply of electric power and heat power, manufacture of electrical machinery
and equipment, manufacture of textile wearing apparel, foot ware and caps, manufacture of
textile, mining and processing of nonmetal ores, manufacture of nonmetallic mineral products,
mining and processing of ferrous metal ores, smelting and pressing of ferrous metals,
manufacture of chemical fibers, manufacture of raw chemical materials and chemical
products, manufacture of transport equipment, manufacture of metal products, mining and
washing of coal, processing of food from agricultural products, processing of petroleum,
coking, processing of nuclear fuel, manufacture of foods, manufacture of beverages,
manufacture of communication equipment, computers and other electronic equipment,
manufacture of general purpose machinery, manufacture of tobacco, manufacture of
medicines, manufacture of measuring instruments and machinery for cultural activity and
office work, mining and processing of non-ferrous metal ores, smelting and pressing of non-
ferrous metals, manufacture of paper and paper products and manufacture of special purpose
machinery.
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Appendix 2: Variable names and significations
Variable names significations
Y Pollution levy per industrial added value (in log)
wY Spatially lagged Pollution levy per industrial added value (in log)
GRP Gross regional product per capita(USD at 2005 price, in log)
SO2intensity
SO2 emission per industrial added value (tons per 10000 USD at
2005 price, in log)
CODintensity
Chemical oxygen demand per industrial added value (tons per
10000 USD at 2005 price, in log)
Density Population density (persons per km2, in log)
State
Proportion of industrial added value created by state-owned
enterprises
Open Ratio between the total trade and gross regional product
FDI
Ratio between actually used foreign direct investments and gross
regional product
Letters
Number of complaint letters regarding environmental issues (in
log)
Edu Percentage of population with high education
IMB Vertical fiscal imbalance indicator
Dum2005 1 if the year of 2005, 0 if not
Dum2006 1 if the year of 2006, 0 if not
Dum2007 1 if the year of 2007, 0 if not
Dum2008 1 if the year of 2008, 0 if not
Dum2009 1 if the year of 2009, 0 if not
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Appendix 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Y 180 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.009
GRP 180 2861.228 2075.915 511.462 11961.220
SO2intensity 180 0.233 0.215 0.017 1.150
CODintensity 180 0.058 0.072 0.001 0.547
Density 180 403.948 527.151 7.486 3029.969
State 180 0.451 0.191 0.059 0.834
Open 180 0.358 0.411 0.045 1.668
FDI 180 0.027 0.020 0.001 0.082
Letters 180 18231.950 19796.200 50.000 105942.000
Edu 180 0.072 0.050 0.025 0.289
IMB 180 0.520 0.185 0.141 0.930
Dum2005 180 0.167 0.374 0.000 1.000
Dum2006 180 0.167 0.374 0.000 1.000
Dum2007 180 0.167 0.374 0.000 1.000
Dum2008 180 0.167 0.374 0.000 1.000
Dum2009 180 0.167 0.374 0.000 1.000
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Appendix 4: Nonlinear marginal effects conditional on IMB
Overall 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Mean 2.964 3.029 2.950 2.948 2.969 2.937 2.952
Minimum 2.165 2.300 2.262 2.241 2.187 2.165 2.203
Lower quartile 2.626 2.668 2.621 2.571 2.530 2.540 2.631
Median 3.078 3.129 3.063 3.067 3.111 3.078 3.045
Upper quartile 3.214 3.290 3.143 3.161 3.205 3.219 3.222
Maximum 3.827 3.827 3.759 3.637 3.623 3.674 3.605
S.D. 0.390 0.378 0.379 0 .378 0 .421 0.416 0.393
Observation number 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
